Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided?
Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided?
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DOI：
10.1007/s00355-013-0767-6
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发表时间：
2014-06-01
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Pauly, Marc
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pauly, Marc
本文建立了足球世界杯或奥运会等复杂体育竞赛形式的战略操纵数学模型。战略操纵指的是球队为了增加赢得比赛的可能性而故意输掉比赛的可能性。这篇论文特别关注了排名第一和第二的选手进入下一轮的循环赛。在许多体育项目中使用的这种标准格式导致了战略操纵的可能性，正如最近在2012年奥运会上所展示的那样。证明了一个不可能定理，该定理证明了在若干合理的侧约束条件下，不可能获得策略证明性。
This paper develops a mathematical model of strategic manipulation in complex sports competition formats such as the soccer world cup or the Olympic games. Strategic manipulation refers here to the possibility that a team may lose a match on purpose in order to increase its prospects of winning the competition. In particular, the paper looks at round-robin tournaments where both first- and second-ranked players proceed to the next round. This standard format used in many sports gives rise to the possibility of strategic manipulation, as exhibited recently in the 2012 Olympic games. An impossibility theorem is proved which demonstrates that under a number of reasonable side-constraints, strategy-proofness is impossible to obtain.