Implications of Mirror Self-Recognition for Self-Awareness
Implications of Mirror Self-Recognition for Self-Awareness
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DOI：
10.1037/cns0000270
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发表时间：
2021-06-03
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Morin, Alain
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Morin, Alain
盖洛普和安德森（2020）最近的一篇文章再次唤起了镜像自我识别（MSR）的精神主义解释。这种观点认为，成功的MSR意味着有机体可以成为自己关注的对象，因为它可以反映自己和其他生物的精神状态。在这里，我重新评估这一主张的其他令人信服的观点MSR;一个主要的结论是，MSR最有可能需要身体意识，而不是内省的私人自我意识;后者可以说需要语言的形式，内部言语，许多生物能够MSR缺乏。我进一步提出了三个具体的问题与心理学的方法之间存在的巨大的时间差距的出现MSR和理论的心灵（ToM）技能的完全建立，事实上，MSR可以观察到在没有自我意识，反之亦然，并声称自我处理是本地化的右半球。对自我意识的非语言黄金标准测试的探索仍在进行中，可能存在于人类和非人类动物在进入一个人的精神状态时观察到的大脑活动的比较中（Bekoff &谢尔曼，2004）。
The mentalistic interpretation of mirror self-recognition (MSR) is once more evoked in a recent article by Gallup and Anderson (2020). This view suggests that successful MSR signifies that the organism can become the object of its own attention in the sense that it can reflect on its own mental states and that of other creatures. Here, I reevaluate this claim in light of other compelling views of MSR; one main conclusion is that MSR most likely entails bodily awareness as opposed to introspective private self-awareness; the latter arguably requires language in the form of inner speech, which many creatures capable of MSR lack. I further raise three specific problems with the mentalistic approach-the large time gap that exists between the emergence of MSR and the full establishment of Theory-of-Mind (ToM) skills, the fact that MSR can be observed in the absence of self-awareness, and vice versa, and the claim that self-processing is localized in the right hemisphere. The quest for a nonverbal gold standard test for self-awareness is still on and might reside in the comparison of brain activity between human and nonhuman animals observed during access to one's mental states (Bekoff & Sherman, 2004).