Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation
Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation
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DOI：
10.1162/002081898753162820
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发表时间：
1998-03-01
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Fearon, JD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fearon, JD
新自由主义者和批评他们的新现实主义者一直在争论国际合作的两个主要障碍的相对重要性——欺骗和执法问题以及相对收益问题。相比之下，我认为国际合作的问题有一个共同的战略结构，其中第三个明显的障碍起着至关重要的作用。几乎不管问题的领域是什么，各州必须首先解决谈判问题，在他们能够实施并开始执行协议之前就条款达成一致。此外，讨价还价和执行问题相互影响。我利用一个博弈模型表明，如果各国必须通过讨价还价来决定要执行的协议，那么“未来的阴影”就会一分为二。对持续互动的高度期望可能会使协议的执行变得更容易，但它也会给各国更努力讨价还价的动力，推迟协议，希望得到更好的协议。来自贸易和军备控制谈判的经验证据表明，这一机制可能有助于解释在国际政治中经常观察到的代价高昂的僵局，这对公认的新自由主义理论来说是一个问题。
Neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation-problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains. By contrast, I argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third, distinct obstacle plays a crucial role. Almost regardless of the issue area, states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement. Furthermore, the bargaining and enforcement problems interact. Using a game model, I show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced, the "shadow of the future" cuts two ways. A high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier, but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal. Empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories.