Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission
Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission
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战略信息获取和传输
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20140135
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Francesco Squintani
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rossella Argenziano;S. Severinov;Francesco Squintani
本文探讨了在战略传播环境中，昂贵的信息获取的含义。我们表明，基于有偏见的专家的意见的均衡决策可能会更精确的信息是由决策者直接获取时，即使专家是不是更有效地比决策者在获取信息。这一结果对组织设计具有重要意义。专家与决策者之间的沟通往往优于将决策权授予专家，以及决策者集中信息获取和决策权。
This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic communication setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's advice may be more precise than when information is directly acquired by the decision maker, even if the expert is not more efficient than the decision maker at acquiring information. This result bears important implications for organization design. Communication by an expert to a decision maker may often outperform delegation of the decision-making authority to the expert, as well as centralization by the decision maker of both information acquisition and decision-making authority.