The ten modes of aenesidemus and the myth of ancient scepticism
The ten modes of aenesidemus and the myth of ancient scepticism
复制标题
埃尼西德穆斯的十种模式和古代怀疑论的神话
DOI:
10.1080/09608789508570921
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发表时间:
1995
影响因子:
0.6
通讯作者:
S. Gaukroger
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Gaukroger
Systematic doubt in the modern, ie post-Cartesian, era takes the form of scepticism. In this paper, I want to show that in antiquity it took the form of something more akin to relativism. I shall began by looking at the ten Modes of Aenesidemus, which form the backbone of the revival of Pyrrhonism in the first century r centuries later. I shall take the ten Modes as a'test case', and my aim is to show that few of them have a natural sceptical reading and that many of them are simply incompatible with scepticism, whereas all of them have a straightforwardly relativist reading. I shall then try and clarify exactly what kind of relativism is involved and what form relativistic doubt takes. I shall argue that scepticism drives epistemological doubt, whereas relativism drives doxastic doubt, and that doubt in antiquity is directed towards beliefs rather than knowledge. Finally, I shall argue that this reading is supported by some key differences between ancient and modern doubt.The most detailed available account of the ten Modes of Aenesidemus is that provided by Annas and Barnes in their translation and commentary on the Modes. They try to place a sceptical reading on the Modes, and it is their interpretation that I shall take issue with. They distinguish between scepticism and relativism in terms of a general opposition: