Failsafe modes in incomplete minority game
Failsafe modes in incomplete minority game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.physa.2009.06.016
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发表时间：
2009-09
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Xiaobo Yao;S. Wan;Wen Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Xiaobo Yao;S. Wan;Wen Chen
对不完全少数者博弈模型进行了故障安全扩展，简要分析了不完全性对系统效率的影响。仿真结果表明，限制策略的不完备性可以提高系统的效率。在三种故障安全模式中，“回到最佳”模式带来了最显著的改善，并使系统效率保持在一个较长的不完全范围内。一个简单的解析公式具有与模拟结果相吻合的趋势。IMMG模型被用来研究分布的影响，我们发现，在每一系列的曲线，有一个交界点，在那里系统的效率不受分布的不完全性。当[公式：见文字]时，不完整性的集中会削弱效果。在[公式：见文字]的另一边，集中注意力会有帮助。当pI接近于零时，使用不完全策略的代理商平均利润比使用标准策略的代理商更好，并且“回到最佳”代理商具有更大的pI范围以获胜。
We make a failsafe extension to the incomplete minority game model, give a brief analysis on how incompleteness will effect system efficiency. Simulations that limited incompleteness in strategies can improve the system efficiency. Among three failsafe modes, the “Back-to-Best” mode brings most significant improvement and keeps the system efficiency in a long range of incompleteness. A simple analytic formula has a trend which matches simulation results. The IMMG model is used to study the effect of distribution, and we find that there is one junction point in each series of curves, at which system efficiency is not influenced by the distribution of incompleteness. When [Formula: see text] the concentration of incompleteness weakens the effect. On the other side of [Formula: see text] , concentration will be helpful. When pIis close to zero agents using incomplete strategies have on average better profits than those using standard strategies, and the “Back-to-Best” agents have a wider range of pIto win.