THE PERSONAL IS PHILOSOPHICAL IS POLITICAL: A PHILOSOPHER AND MOTHER OF A COGNITIVELY DISABLED PERSON SENDS NOTES FROM THE BATTLEFIELD
THE PERSONAL IS PHILOSOPHICAL IS POLITICAL: A PHILOSOPHER AND MOTHER OF A COGNITIVELY DISABLED PERSON SENDS NOTES FROM THE BATTLEFIELD
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01600.x
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发表时间：
2009-07-01
期刊：
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Kittay, Eva Feder
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kittay, Eva Feder
在根据我作为一个有认知障碍女儿的母亲的经历对哲学进行批判时，我遇到了地雷，我问：“我应该继续吗？“我捍卫这样一种观点，即追求这个项目是残疾人及其家庭所做的无形护理工作的一部分。试图通过这种经验来影响认知残疾的哲学概念的价值，是由个人、政治和哲学之间不可分割的关系所证明的。如果人们赠款母亲和孩子之间的“特殊关系”需要道德上的承认，那么我首先需要生动地说明，在一个缺乏某些“正常能力”的孩子的情况下，这种关系与任何母亲和孩子的关系都没有区别。如果是这样的话，那么我相信我可以提出一个案例，其结论是，即使是严重认知障碍的人，也必须被赋予道德人格。此外，我认为，这种承认需要承认与儿童没有特殊关系的其他人。
Having encountered landmines in offering a critique of philosophy based on my experience as the mother of a cognitively disabled daughter, I ask, "Should I continue?" I defend the idea that pursuing this project is of a piece with the invisible care labor that is done by people with disabilities and their families. The value of attempting to influence philosophical conceptions of cognitive disability by virtue of this experience is justified by an inextricable relationship between the personal, the political, and the philosophical. If one grants that the "special relationship" between mother and child requires moral recognition, then I need first to make vivid the case that this relationship in the case of a child who lacks some "normal capacities" is indistinguishable from any mother-child relationship. If this is so, then I believe I can make a case that has as its conclusion that the moral personhood of even the severely cognitively disabled must be granted. Moreover, such recognition, I argue, necessitates the recognition of others who bear no special relationships to the child.