Disagreement in Bargaining
Disagreement in Bargaining
复制标题
谈判中出现分歧
DOI：
10.1177/002200278102500206
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发表时间：
1981
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
A. Roth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. W. Malouf;A. Roth
本研究报告了一项旨在测试阿克塞尔罗德的利益冲突措施的预测价值的实验。结果支持的结论，阿克塞尔罗德的措施是一个很好的预测所需的时间，以达成协议，在一个给定的讨价还价的游戏，但它不是一个很好的pedictor的频率与分歧将在一个给定的游戏中观察到。这一结论的理论意义进行了讨论。
This study reports an experiment designed to test the predictive value of Axelrod's measure of conflict of interest. The results support the conclusion that Axelrod's measure is a good predictor of the time required to reach agreement in a given bargaining game, but that it is not a good pedictor of the frequency with which disagreements will be observed in a given game. The theoretical implications of this conclusion are discussed.