Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry
Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry
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所有权、代理权和工资：快餐业特许经营考察
DOI：
10.2307/2937907
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发表时间：
1991
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
A. Krueger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Krueger
本文估计了公司自营快餐店和特许经营快餐店之间的薪酬差异。这种对比很有趣，因为合同安排让公司直营网点的经理缺乏监督和监督员工的动力。基于两组数据的估计表明，公司直营店的员工薪酬略高于加盟商直营店的员工薪酬。助理和值班经理的收入差距为 9%，全职船员的收入差距为 2%。此外，公司自营餐厅的任期收入状况更为陡峭。这些发现表明，监测困难会影响补偿的时机和慷慨程度。
This paper estimates the difference in compensation between company-owned and franchisee-owned fast food restaurants. The contrast is of interest because contractual arrangements give managers of company-owned outlets less of an incentive to monitor and supervise employees. Estimates based on two data sets suggest that employee compensation is slightly greater at company-owned outlets than at franchisee-owned outlets. The earnings gap is 9 percent for assistant and shift managers and 2 percent for full-time crew workers. Furthermore, the tenure-earnings profile is steeper at company-owned restaurants. These findings suggest that monitoring difficulties influence the timing and generosity of compensation.