Quality improvement incentive strategies in a supply chain

Quality improvement incentive strategies in a supply chain
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DOI:
10.1016/j.tre.2018.01.005
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发表时间:
2018-06
期刊:
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
S. Yoo;Taesu Cheong
S. Yoo;Taesu Cheong
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Yoo;Taesu Cheong

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本文研究了买方驱动供应链中协同产品质量改进的几种激励机制,以及这些机制对供应链绩效的影响。买方,即Stackelberg领导者,决定产品的销售价格,而供应商则负责生产和产品质量的确定。我们开发的分析模型,结合两个奖励计划,以更好地了解如何买方可以促进供应商的质量改进工作。我们为供应链中实施质量管理提供管理见解和实用指南,这些见解和指南来自分析比较和数值实验。
This paper investigates several incentive mechanisms for collaborative product quality improvement in a buyer-driven supply chain, and the impacts of those mechanisms on supply chain performance. The buyer, the Stackelberg leader, determines the sales price of a product while the supplier is responsible for production and product quality determination. We develop analytical models incorporating two reward schemes to better understand how the buyer can facilitate the supplier’s quality improvement efforts. We offer managerial insights and practical guidelines for implementing quality management in the supply chain, derived from both an analytical comparison and numerical experiments.