How locally designed access and use controls can prevent the tragedy of the commons in a Mexican small-scale fishing community
How locally designed access and use controls can prevent the tragedy of the commons in a Mexican small-scale fishing community
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DOI：
10.1080/08941920590959631
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发表时间：
2005-08-01
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Basurto, X
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Basurto, X
斯里人是墨西哥加利福尼亚州海湾的一个由小规模渔民组成的自治社区，他们拥有渔场的所有权，他们在那里捕捞价值极高的商业双壳类物种。外来者渴望进入，社区制定了一套允许他们进入的规则。由于塞尔维亚政府官员保留了授予这种准入所产生的所有经济利益，社区成员创建了替代进入机制，将这些利益转移到自己手中。在哈丁的公地悲剧模型下，这种情况最终会导致渔业的过度开发。然而，斯雷人能够同时保持对其渔场的准入和使用控制，以继续维持其渔场的可持续性。利用公共资源池理论的见解，我讨论了系列社区特征如何帮助调解集体行动困境与访问和使用控制之间的冲突。
The Seri people, a self-governed community of small-scale fishermen in the Gulf of California, Mexico, have ownership rights to fishing grounds where they harvest highly valuable commercial species of bivalves. Outsiders are eager to gain access, and the community has devised a set of rules to allow them in. Because Seri government officials keep all the economic benefits generated from granting this access for themselves, community members create alternative entry mechanisms to divert those benefits to themselves. Under Hardin's model of the tragedy of the commons, this situation would eventually lead to the overexploitation of the fishery. The Seri people, however, are able to simultaneously maintain access and use controls for the continuing sustainability of their fishing grounds. Using insights from common-pool resources theory, I discuss how Seri community characteristics help mediate the conflict between collective action dilemmas and access and use controls.