TRADEOFFS AMONG REASONS FOR ACTION
TRADEOFFS AMONG REASONS FOR ACTION
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-5914.1986.tb00074.x
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发表时间：
1986-07-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
BARON, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BARON, J
在劳伦斯·科尔伯格教授关于道德思考的研讨会上，一件有趣的事情发生在我身上。科尔伯格提出了他的经典困境(例如，科尔伯格，1970)，关于丈夫是否应该为了挽救妻子的生命而偷药。当科尔伯格问有多少人认为丈夫应该偷药时，几乎所有人都举起了手，包括我在内。下一个问题大概是“有多少人认为一个人认为丈夫不应该偷药是错误的？”令我惊讶的是，我的手是少数几个没有举起来的人之一。我想知道为什么不能。我真的是个隐秘的相对主义者(或主观主义者)吗？Z是错的那个人吗？这篇论文就是这一惊奇的结果。我的主要主张涉及我所称的规范性和规范性的行动理论(Baron，1985a，b)。简而言之，我用规范性理论来阐述如何做出行动决定的规则。规范理论代表了规范理论试图实现的目标。这些类型的理论对于涉及不同考虑的权衡的选择特别重要，一个权衡一个行动，另一个权衡另一个行动。这些考虑可能是道德的、审慎的，或者(最典型的)两者兼而有之。我们有时倾向于遵循Ficiul MFE，这是一种规则，在这种规则中，一个考虑总是优先于另一个考虑，而不管第二个考虑的强度或第一个考虑的可能性是否相关。例如，我们可能会说生命比财产更重要，以此来证明偷药是正当的。我的论点是，从规范的角度来看，这种词汇规则不能被决定性地证明是合理的。因此，如果一个人同时考虑生命和财产，并在特定情况下认定对财产的损害大于对生命的损害，从规范的角度来看，他不一定是错误的。尽管词汇规则可能会被证明是规定性规则，但这样的理由取决于关于人类心理的说法--这些说法可能只对某些人正确(例如，现在的人)。
A funny thing happened to me at a workshop given by Professor Lawrence Kohlberg about moral thinking. Kohlberg presented his classic dilemma (eg, Kohlberg, 1970) about whether a husband should steal a drug in order to save his wife’s life. When Kohlberg asked how many thought that the husband should steal the drug, almost all hands went up, including mine. The next question was, roughly,“How many think that a person would be wrong to think that the husband should not steal the drug?” To my surprise, my hand was one of the few not to go up. I wondered why not. Was I really a closet relativist (or subjectivist)? Was Z the one who was wrong? This paper is the result of that wondering.My main claim concerns what I have called the normative and prescriptive theory of action (Baron, 1985a, b). Briefly, I take prescriptive theory to set out the rules of how to make decisions about action. Normative theory represents the goal that prescriptive theory tries to achieve. These kinds of theory are of particular importance for choices that involve tradeoffs of different considerations, one weighing on the side of one action, another on the side of another. These considerations might be moral, prudential, or (most typically) both. We are sometimes inclined to follow fexicul mfes, rules in which one consideration is always primary to another, regardless of the strength of the second or the improbability of the first being relevant. For example, we might justify stealing the drug by saying that life is more important than property. My argument is that such lexical rules cannot be decisively justified from a normative point of view. Therefore, if a person considers both life and property, and decides that the damage to property outweighs the damage to life in a given case, he is not necessarily wrong from a normative point of view. Although lexical rules may be justifiable as prescriptive rules, such justifications are contingent on claims about human psychology-claims that may be correct for some people only (eg, people of the present time).’