Restart-Based Security Mechanisms for Safety-Critical Embedded Systems
Restart-Based Security Mechanisms for Safety-Critical Embedded Systems
复制标题
适用于安全关键型嵌入式系统的基于重启的安全机制
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Caccamo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Fardin Abdi;Chien;M. Hasan;Songran Liu;Sibin Mohan;M. Caccamo
许多由嵌入式系统控制的物理工厂都有安全要求，需要始终遵守-任何与预期行为的偏差都可能导致系统（通常是物理工厂），环境损坏，甚至危及人类生命。近年来，针对此类系统的恶意攻击有所增加，其中许多攻击的目的是造成物理损害。在本文中，我们的目标是解耦的安全性的植物从嵌入式系统的安全性，利用这种系统的固有惯性。在本文中，我们提出了一个系统范围内的重启为基础的框架，结合硬件和软件组件（a）保持系统的安全区域内，（B）阻止潜在的攻击者不稳定的系统。我们证明了我们的方法的可行性，使用两个现实的系统-一个实际的3自由度（3-DoF）的直升机和模拟仓库温度控制单元。我们的概念验证的实施进行了测试，对这些系统的控制单元上的多个模拟攻击。
Many physical plants that are controlled by embedded systems have safety requirements that need to be respected at all times - any deviations from expected behavior can result in damage to the system (often to the physical plant), the environment or even endanger human life. In recent times, malicious attacks against such systems have increased - many with the intent to cause physical damage. In this paper, we aim to decouple the safety of the plant from security of the embedded system by taking advantage of the inherent inertia in such systems. In this paper we present a system-wide restart-based framework that combines hardware and software components to (a) maintain the system within the safety region and (b) thwart potential attackers from destabilizing the system. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach using two realistic systems - an actual 3 degree of freedom (3-DoF) helicopter and a simulated warehouse temperature control unit. Our proof-of-concept implementation is tested against multiple emulated attacks on the control units of these systems.