Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions
Differential Signaling Compromises Video Information Security Through AM and FM Leakage Emissions
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差分信号通过 AM 和 FM 泄漏发射损害视频信息安全
DOI：
10.1109/temc.2020.3000830
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
G. Vandenbosch
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pieterjan De Meulemeester;B. Scheers;G. Vandenbosch
使用差分信号技术的视频显示单元 (VDU) 会显着增加因泄漏发射而损害视频信息安全的风险。本文表明差分信号电缆是重要的视频泄漏源。提出了一个概念来解释使用差分信号电缆（例如高清多媒体接口（HDMI）电缆、数字视频接口（DVI）电缆和低压差分信号（LVDS）电缆）的VDU的视频泄漏原理。通过同时测量 LVDS 线路上的差分视频信号及其近场和远场泄漏发射，仔细检查 LVDS 电缆的辐射。从这些测量中，得出了几个结论，为使用差分信号方法的 VDU 的视频窃听风险提供了新的见解。此外，还提出了一种新颖的视频图像重建方法，该方法通过使用频率解调技术来利用 VDU 的妥协发射。本文表明，使用差分信号电缆的 VDU 泄漏的视频发射不仅是调幅 (AM)，而且是调频 (FM)。这强烈意味着恶意视频窃听者可能使用的算法工具集比目前假设的要大得多。本文研究了 10 m 距离处的几种 VDU 设置，包括超高清视频显示器、三种不同的 HDMI 电缆和两台笔记本电脑。此外，还讨论并比较了基于 AM 和基于 FM 的视频图像重建结果。
Video display units (VDUs) using differential signaling technology significantly increase the risk of compromising video information security through leakage emissions. This article shows that differential signaling cables act as substantial video leakage sources. A concept is proposed that explains the video leakage principles of VDUs using differential signal cables such as the high-definition multimedia interface (HDMI) cable, digital visual interface (DVI) cable, and the low-voltage differential signaling (LVDS) cable. The emanations of the LVDS cable are closely examined by measuring simultaneously the differential video signal on the LVDS lines and its near- and far-field leakage emissions. From these measurements, several conclusions are drawn that give new insights into the video eavesdropping risk of VDUs using differential signaling methods. Furthermore, a novel video image reconstruction method is proposed that exploits the compromising emanations of a VDU by using frequency demodulation techniques. This article shows that leaked video emanations of VDUs using differential signaling cables are not only amplitude modulated (AM) but also frequency modulated (FM). This strongly implies that the possible algorithmic toolset of malicious video eavesdroppers is much larger than currently assumed. This article investigates several VDU setups at a distance of 10 m, including an ultrahigh-definition video display, three different HDMI cables and two notebooks. Additionally, the AM-based and FM-based video image reconstruction results are discussed and compared.
个人计算机发出的电磁噪声中包含的显示图像中的信息信号测量方法
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
Tatsushi Nishi;Yuichiro Hiranaka;Masahiro Inuiguchi;瀬戸 信二;関口秀紀;関口秀紀;Hidenori Sekiguchi;関 口秀紀;関口秀紀;関口秀紀;関口秀紀;関口秀紀;関口秀紀;関 口秀紀;関口秀紀;関口秀紀
通讯作者：
関口秀紀