Laws, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief
Laws, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief
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法律、其他条件不变的条件和信念的动力
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-017-1009-1_5
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
W. Spohn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Spohn
规律和偶然概括之间的特征性区别在于我们对它们的认识或归纳态度。这一观点已经采取了各种形式，并在过去几十年中主导了关于法律相似性的讨论。同样，关于其他条件不变的问题本质上是关于我们如何在认识上处理异常。因此，排名理论与其资源的可废止的推理似乎非常适合解释这些点在一个正式的方式。这就是本文试图做的。因此，一个定律只不过是一系列独立同分布随机变量的确定性模拟。这意味着，德·菲内蒂的表示定理可以直接转化为对这样设想的定律的确认的说明。
The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn out that a law is simply the deterministic analogue of a sequence of independent, identically distributed random variables. This entails that de Finetti's representation theorems can be directly transformed into an account of confirmation of laws thus conceived.