Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
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DOI：
10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2
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发表时间：
2013-06
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Yoichi Kasajima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yoichi Kasajima
我们考虑当偏好配置文件是单峰时，在一组抽奖代理人之间分配不可分割的商品的问题。不幸的是，即使在这个有限的偏好领域，平等对待、随机支配效率和随机支配策略证明性也是不相容的。
We consider the problem of assigning indivisible goods among a group of agents with lotteries when the preference profile is single-peaked. Unfortunately, even on this restricted domain of preferences,equal treatment of equals,stochastic dominance efficiency, andstochastic dominance strategy-proofnessare incompatible.