On the Basic Limits of RF-Fingerprint-Based Authentication
On the Basic Limits of RF-Fingerprint-Based Authentication
复制标题
论基于射频指纹的身份验证的基本限制
DOI：
10.1109/tit.2016.2572725
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
C. E. Koksal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Onur Güngör;C. E. Koksal
RF指纹识别利用射频链中的无线电的变化来唯一地识别发射机，并将对抗性传输与合法节点的传输区分开。我们提供了一个系统的方法，从信息论的根源，以评估RF指纹的基本性能限制。我们开发了一种新的信道模型的RF指纹，在RF链中的缺陷被建模为一个指纹通道，级联到实际的物理信道。我们解决的认证问题中存在的对手，其中合法的发射机和对手都配备了独特的指纹通道，除了一个可能的秘密密钥可在合法的节点。我们提供的边界的合法节点的可靠通信的错误指数，和成功指数的模仿和替代攻击的对手，作为一定的参数的函数，基于他们的RF指纹，和共享的密钥速率。我们说明了无密钥认证是可能的，通过RF指纹时，合法的渠道是不可模拟的。我们还表明，这些攻击的概率可以通过采用额外的专用认证节点显着降低。
RF fingerprinting exploits the variations in the RF chain of radios to uniquely identify transmitters, and distinguish adversarial transmissions from the transmissions of legitimate nodes. We provide a systematic approach rooted from the information theory to evaluate the basic performance limits of RF fingerprinting. We develop a novel channel model for RF fingerprinting, where the imperfections in the RF chain are modeled as a fingerprint channel, cascaded to the actual physical channel. We address the authentication problem in the presence of an adversary, where both the legitimate transmitter and the adversary are equipped with unique fingerprint channels, in addition to a possible secret key available at the legitimate nodes. We provide bounds for the error exponents for reliable communication of the legitimate nodes, and the success exponent for impersonation and substitution attacks of the adversary, as a function of certain parameters based on their RF-fingerprints, and the shared key rate. We illustrate that keyless authentication is possible via RF fingerprints when the legitimate channel is not simulatable. We also show that the probability of these attacks can be reduced significantly by employing additional dedicated authenticated nodes.