How Do Electoral Incentives Affect Legislator Behavior ?
How Do Electoral Incentives Affect Legislator Behavior ?
复制标题
选举激励如何影响立法者行为？
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Stephane Wolton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alexander Fouirnaies;Andrew B. Hall;Steve Levitt;Julia Payson;Ken Scheve;Dan Thompson;Stephane Wolton
我们研究选举激励如何影响政治家如何分配他们的努力。为此，我们编制了一个新的数据集，其中包含大约780，000个法案，以及大约6，000名在美国州立法机构任职的立法者的超过1600万个唱名投票记录。使用个人层面的差异差异设计，我们发现，立法者谁可以不再寻求连任赞助更少的法案，是在委员会的生产力较低，并缺席更多的地板投票，平均。这些影响对那些今后不再寻求公职的立法者来说是最大的，并且集中在立法者工资高的州。研究四个州提供的具体法案的预算影响的估计，我们还发现，任期有限的立法者没有更多的财政负责，相反的短视的选民和政治商业周期的理论。综上所述，证据表明，选举激励影响立法者如何在重要方面分配努力。亚历山大福伊尔奈是哈里斯公共政策学院的助理教授。安德鲁B。霍尔（andrewbhall@stanford.edu）是斯坦福大学政治学副教授。为了进行有益的讨论，作者感谢阿维·阿查里亚、斯科特·阿什沃思、克里斯·贝瑞、亚当·博尼卡、伊桑·德梅斯基塔、布鲁斯凯恩、加里考克斯、吉姆·费伦、安东尼·福勒、萨阿德·古尔扎尔、艾丽莎·霍尔、威尔·豪厄尔、纳文·卡蒂克、史蒂夫·莱维特、朱莉娅·佩森、肯·谢夫、丹·汤普森、斯蒂芬·沃尔顿以及斯坦福大学美国政治研讨会、哈里斯学院政治经济研讨会的参与者，芝加哥大学美国政治研讨会，伦敦政治经济学院PSPE研讨会，罗切斯特的美国政治研讨会，沃里克的政治经济学研讨会，以及哈斯商学院政治经济学研讨会。"每一部政治宪法的目的都是...第一，让统治者拥有最大的智慧去辨别，最大的美德去追求，社会的共同利益;其次，采取最有效的预防措施，让他们保持美德，同时继续保持公众的信任。
We study how electoral incentives affect how politicians allocate their effort. To do so, we compile a new dataset containing roughly 780,000 bills, combined with more than 16 million roll-call voting records for roughly 6,000 legislators serving in U.S. state legislatures with term limits. Using an individual-level difference-in-differences design, we find that legislators who can no longer seek reelection sponsor fewer bills, are less productive on committees, and are absent for more floor votes, on average. These effects are largest for legislators who never seek office again in the future, and are concentrated in states with high legislative salaries. Studying four states which provide estimates of the budget impact of specific bills, we also find that term-limited legislators are no more fiscally responsible, contrary to theories of myopic electorates and political business cycles. Taken together, the evidence suggests that electoral incentives influence how legislators allocate effort in important ways. ∗Alexander Fouirnaies is an Assistant Professor at the Harris School of Public Policy. Andrew B. Hall (andrewbhall@stanford.edu) is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. For helpful discussion, the authors thank Avi Acharya, Scott Ashworth, Chris Berry, Adam Bonica, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce Cain, Gary Cox, Jim Fearon, Anthony Fowler, Saad Gulzar, Alisa Hall, Will Howell, Navin Kartik, Steve Levitt, Julia Payson, Ken Scheve, Dan Thompson, Stephane Wolton, and participants of the Stanford American Politics Workshop, the Political Economy workshop at the Harris School, the UChicago American Politics Workshop, the LSE PSPE seminar, Rochester’s American Politics Workshop, Warwick’s Political Economics seminar, and the Haas School of Business Political Economy Workshop. “The aim of every political constitution is...first to obtain for rulers [those] who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”