Self-Preferencing in Markets with Vertically-Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms
Self-Preferencing in Markets with Vertically-Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms
复制标题
垂直整合的看门人平台在市场中的自我偏好
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3701250
复制
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Piccolo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jorge Padilla;J. Perkins;S. Piccolo
“看门人”平台的竞争战略受到更严格的审查。例如，苹果和谷歌被指控向应用程序提供商收取过高的访问费，并对自己的应用程序进行恶意攻击。一些人认为，当该平台的商业模式是销售设备时，这些指控在经济上没有意义。在本文中，我们建立了一个模型，在这个模型中，一个看门人设备销售商面临着潜在的饱和需求，其设备有激励和能力，从市场上排除第三方供应商的服务，消费者通过其设备购买。如果对平台设备的需求增长缓慢或为负，则更有可能发生止赎，如果设备销售商的服务不如第三方提供的服务，则可能损害消费者。
The competitive strategies of 'gatekeeper' platforms are subject to enhanced scrutiny. For instance, Apple and Google are being accused of charging excessive access fees to app providers and privileging their own apps. Some have argued that such allegations make no economic sense when the platform's business model is to sell devices. In this paper, we build a model in which a gatekeeper device-seller facing potentially saturated demand for its device has the incentive and the ability to exclude from the market third-party suppliers of a service that consumers buy via its devices. Foreclosure is more likely if demand growth for the platform's devices is slow or negative, and can harm consumers if the device-seller's services are inferior to those offered by the third parties.
DOI：
10.1287/isre.2018.0787
发表时间：
2016-06
期刊：
Inf. Syst. Res.
影响因子：
--
作者：
Jens Förderer;T. Kude;Sunil Mithas;Armin Heinzl
通讯作者：
Jens Förderer;T. Kude;Sunil Mithas;Armin Heinzl