Propositional reasoning by mental models? Simple to refute in principle and in practice.
Propositional reasoning by mental models? Simple to refute in principle and in practice.
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通过心智模型进行命题推理？
DOI：
10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.711
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yingrui Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David P. O'Brien;M. Braine;Yingrui Yang
两个实验比较了心理模型理论和心理逻辑理论的预测。结果表明，人们不会做出由心理模型理论预测而不是由心理逻辑理论预测的错误推理，人们通常会做出许多由心理逻辑理论预测的有效推理，而这些推理在心理模型理论中应该是太难的。因此，心理逻辑理论更好地解释了这些数据。这两个理论之间的差异有关的顺序，其中作出的推论的预测也进行了调查。这些数据显然支持心理逻辑理论。心理逻辑理论对命题推理中的实际心理过程提供了更合理的描述。
Two experiments compared the predictions of mental-models theory with a mental-logic theory. Results show that people do not make fallacious inferences predicted by mental-models theory but not predicted by mental-logic theory and that people routinely make many valid inferences predicted by mental-logic theory that should be too difficult on mental-models theory. Thus, the mental-logic theory accounts better for the data. A difference between the two theories concerning predictions about the order in which inferences are made was also investigated. The data clearly favor the mental-logic theory. It is argued that the mental-logic theory provides the more plausible description of the actual psychological processes in propositional reasoning.