On the Question of Generosity: Who Supports Foreign Aid to Whom?-Lessons from Turkey and Greece
On the Question of Generosity: Who Supports Foreign Aid to Whom?-Lessons from Turkey and Greece
复制标题
DOI：
10.1093/ijpor/edz008
复制
发表时间：
2020-03-01
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Kiratli, Osman Sabri
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kiratli, Osman Sabri
研究很好地证明了公众意见和实际援助流动之间的联系，这些研究发现，有证据表明，政策制定者在分配外国援助时对公众意见很敏感，而且捐助国的援助预算与公众支持密切相关(例如，Lumsdaine，1993；Milner，Hawkins，Lake，Nielson&Tierney，2006；Mosley，1985；Stern，1998)。然而，正如米尔纳和廷利(Milner&Tingley)(2013)所说，当一个人从总体层面转移到个人层面时，文学就会变得“更薄”。对推动公民对外援助态度的经济因素的几项调查侧重于资本和教育水平的天赋(例如，Milner&Tingley，2010)、相对收入(例如，Chong&Gradstein，2008)以及对他们个人财务状况和国内政府的满意度(例如，Chong&Gradstein，2008；Diven&Constantelos，2009)。在概念谱的一端，研究确定了倾向信念在外交政策上的重要作用(例如，Wittkopf&Maggiotto，1983)，国家在经济管理和公共福利中的角色(Paxton&Knack，2012)，意识形态和党派偏见(例如，Imbeau，1988；NoëL&Thérien，1995；Tingley，2010)，普遍信任(例如，Bayram，2017)，以及宗教信仰(例如，Lumsdaine，1993；Nelson，1988；Paxton&Knack，2012)。尽管在解释国际团结态度的经济或概念预测因素的优先顺序方面，研究存在差异，但它们在两个方面基本上是一致的。首先，几乎所有这些文件都侧重于发展援助委员会(发援会)的主要成员，而忽视了较小的发援会成员或非发援会官方发展援助捐助国。然而，全球援助数据证实，援助市场上越来越多的是新兴捐赠者，如中国、俄罗斯、巴西和土耳其。经合组织报告说，非发援会捐助者在#年贡献了超过13.1%的发展援助总额。
The link between public opinion and actual aid flow is well documented by studies that find evidence that policymakers are sensitive to public opinion on allocating foreign aid and that the aid budget of donor countries is closely associated with public support (eg, Lumsdaine, 1993; Milner, Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, & Tierney, 2006; Mosley, 1985; Stern, 1998). Yet, when one moves from aggregate to the individual level, the literature becomes ‘‘thinner,’’as Milner & Tingley (2013) put it. Several investigations into the economic factors that drive citizen attitudes on foreign aid focus on the endowment of capital and education levels (eg, Milner & Tingley, 2010), relative income (eg, Chong & Gradstein, 2008), and satisfaction with their personal financial situation and the domestic government (eg, Chong & Gradstein, 2008; Diven & Constantelos, 2009). At the ideational end of the spectrum, studies identify the substantial roles of dispositional beliefs on foreign policy (eg, Wittkopf & Maggiotto, 1983), the role of the state in economic management and public welfare (Paxton & Knack, 2012), ideology and partisanship (eg, Imbeau, 1988; Noël & Thérien, 1995; Tingley, 2010), generalized trust (eg, Bayram, 2017), and religiosity (eg, Lumsdaine, 1993; Nelson, 1988; Paxton & Knack, 2012). Though studies differ in prioritizing economic or ideational sets of predictors to explain international solidarity attitudes, they largely converge on two grounds. First, almost all these pieces focus on major Development Assistant Committee (DAC) members and disregard smaller DAC members or non-DAC contributors of ODA. However, global aid figures confirm the aid market is increasingly populated by emerging donors such as China, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey. The OECD reports that non-DAC donors contributed more than 13.1% of total development aid in