Private Versus Public Debt: Evidence from Firms that Replace Bank Loans with Junk Bonds
Private Versus Public Debt: Evidence from Firms that Replace Bank Loans with Junk Bonds
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私人债务与公共债务：来自用垃圾债券取代银行贷款的公司的证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.140093
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jerold B. Warner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Stuart C. Gilson;Jerold B. Warner
我们研究通过利用垃圾债券收益偿还银行贷款来减少私人债务的公司。债务合同差异很大，银行债务的合同限制更加严格。样本公司是盈利的，但在垃圾债券发行之前营业利润下降。盈利下降进一步收紧了银行债务的限制，而这些公司现有银行左轮手枪的借贷能力有限。我们的测试表明，银行债务偿还使公司能够保持快速增长的能力。对于付款的其他解释，例如管理者希望避免银行监控，几乎没有得到支持。
We study firms that reduced private debt by repaying bank loans with proceeds from junk bonds. The debt contracts differ dramatically, and the contractual restrictions in bank debt are tighter. Sample firms are profitable, but experience operating earnings declines just prior to the junk bond issues. The earnings declines further tighten restrictions in bank debt, and the firms have limited borrowing capacity under their existing bank revolvers. Our tests indicate that bank debt paydowns enabled the firms to maintain their ability to grow rapidly. Alternative explanations for the paydowns, such as managers' desire to avoid bank monitoring, have little support.