Uniform Versus Discriminatory Tariffs
Uniform Versus Discriminatory Tariffs
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统一关税与歧视性关税
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00616.x
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Myles
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Hashimzade;Hassan Khodavaisi;G. Myles
我们分析了当政府使用最优政策以最大化福利时，两个生产差异化产品的出口国和一个进口国之间的非合作互动。分析包括产品差异化，不对称成本和伯特兰竞争。对于相同的出口国，我们表明，进口国总是喜欢一个统一的关税制度，而出口国更喜欢任何程度的产品差异化的歧视性关税制度。如果各国在生产成本方面不对称，那么成本较高的出口商总是倾向于歧视性制度，而成本较低的出口商则倾向于统一制度，如果存在很大的成本差异。在成本不对称的情况下，进口商宣布统一关税制度不是一种可信的战略，因为存在着偏离歧视的动机。这意味着一个国际机构可以在确保关税协定得到遵守方面发挥作用。
We analyze the non-cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher-cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower-cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.