EVOLUTION OF EQUILIBRIA IN THE LONG-RUN - A GENERAL-THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
EVOLUTION OF EQUILIBRIA IN THE LONG-RUN - A GENERAL-THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
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DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1014
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发表时间：
1995-04-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
ROB, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
KANDORI, M;ROB, R
我们扩展了Kandori等人研究的进化过程，Econometrica 61（1993），29-56，to n x n games.演化过程由两种力量驱动：玩家切换到当前策略配置的最佳反应，以及玩家尝试新策略。我们发现，一个独特的行为模式，称为长期均衡，即使潜在的游戏有多个（静态）均衡。本文给出了一个计算LRE的一般算法，并将其应用于两类经济对策。对于纯协调博弈，LRE是帕累托有效均衡。对于具有战略互补性的博弈，最佳对策对应的几何形状有助于确定LRE。(C)出版社：Academic Press
We extend the evolutionary process studied in Kandori er al., Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-56, to n x n games. The evolutionary process is driven by two forces: players switching to the best response against the present strategy configuration, and players experimenting with new strategies. We show that a unique behavior pattern, called the long-run equilibrium, arises even if the underlying game has multiple (static) equilibria. The paper gives a general algorithm for computing the LRE, and then applies it to two classes of economic games. For games of pure coordination, the LRE is the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. For games with strategic complementarities, the geometry of the best-response correspondence helps identify the LRE. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.