Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1273622
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发表时间：
2008-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Klaus;M. Walzl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Klaus;M. Walzl
我们考虑了几个概念的多对多匹配市场的合同，并提供了一个稳定的配置一般，可替代的，强可替代的偏好之间的关系的分析。除了获得“集包含结果”的所有三个域，我们引入弱setwise稳定性作为一个新的稳定性概念，并证明了替代偏好的成对稳定匹配集是非空的，并符合弱setwise稳定匹配集。对于强替代偏好，两两稳定匹配集与两两稳定匹配集重合。
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from obtaining "set inclusion results" on all three domains, we introduce weak setwise stability as a new stability concept and prove that for substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty and coincides with the set of weakly setwise stable matchings. For strongly substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings coincides with the set of setwise stable matchings.