Big Auditors, Private Firms and Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence
Big Auditors, Private Firms and Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence
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大审计师、私营公司和会计保守主义：西班牙证据
DOI：
10.1080/09638180902989426
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Manuel Cano
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Manuel Cano
本文分析了大审计师与有条件稳健性和无条件稳健性的关系。借鉴西班牙公司的样本，目前的研究表明，尽管保持独立性的小激励，大审计师促进有条件的保守主义，从而提高其客户的会计信息的承包效率。然而，研究结果也表明，对于高水平的诉讼和声誉风险，大审计师倾向于促进无条件的保守性，这可能会降低财务报告的质量。在此基础上，我的结论是，在没有必要的诉讼和声誉风险，大审计师通常提供更高质量的审计比非大审计师做。然而，由于大审计师变得过于保守，这种差异在诉讼和声誉风险方面可能会变得更加微妙。
This paper analyses the relationship between Big Auditors and the conditional and unconditional forms of conservatism. Drawing on a sample of Spanish firms, the current study suggests that despite small incentives for maintaining independence, Big Auditors promote conditional conservatism, thereby increasing the contracting efficiency of their clients' accounting information. The results also indicate, however, that for high levels of litigation and reputation risk, Big Auditors tend to promote unconditional conservatism, which can reduce the quality of financial reports. On this basis, I conclude that in the absence of essential litigation and reputation risk, Big Auditors typically provide higher quality audits than non-Big Auditors do. This differentiation may become subtler with litigation and reputation risk, however, because Big Auditors become overly conservative.