The Dynamics of Default and Debt Reorganization
The Dynamics of Default and Debt Reorganization
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DOI：
10.1093/revfin/12.3.0535
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发表时间：
1999-07
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Pierre Mella-Barral
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pierre Mella-Barral
该条记载了这样一个事实，即当债务人决定过早地不履行其义务时，债权人作为剩余求偿人在强制进行代价高昂的清算之前作出让步，符合其集体利益。同样，如果债务人宁愿在效率低下的后期阶段违约，则提议偏离绝对优先权规则符合债权人的利益。本文建立了一个动态债务重组的连续时间定价模型，该模型反映了交易双方相对议价能力的重要影响。针对股权和债务推导出简单直观的路径相关定价公式。债务能力以及企业的资本结构的演变，在其存在的。牛津大学出版社代表金融研究学会在其期刊《金融研究评论》上发表的文章。
This article documents the fact that when debtors decide to default on their obligations too early, it is in the creditors' collective interest, as residual claimants, to make concessions prior to forcing a costly liquidation. Symmetrically, when debtors prefer to default at an inefficiently late stage, it is in the creditors' interest to propose a departure from the absolute priority rule. This article develops a continuous time pricing model of dynamic debt restructuring that reflects the crucial influence of the two counterparties' relative bargaining power. Simple and intuitive path-dependent pricing formulae are derived for equity and debt. The debt capacity as well as the evolution of the firm's capital structure throughout its existence is provided. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.