Worker Replacement
Worker Replacement
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工人更换
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1291130
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Espen R. Moen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Menzio;Espen R. Moen
我们考虑了一个摩擦劳动力市场，在这个市场中，公司希望确保他们的高级员工免受收入波动的影响，同时希望招募新员工来填补空缺职位。企业可以承诺制定工资表，即根据员工的任期和其他可观察指标，具体规定企业支付给员工的工资。然而，公司不能承诺与任何工人建立雇用关系，也就是说，公司可以随意解雇工人。我们发现，由于公司的有限的承诺，最优的时间表规定不仅是一个刚性的工资为高级员工，但也向下刚性工资为新员工。此外，我们发现，虽然高级工人的工资刚性并不影响劳动力的分配，但新雇员的工资刚性放大了失业和空缺对总劳动生产率的负面冲击的反应。
We consider a frictional labor market in which firms want to insure their senior employees against income fluctuations and, at the same time, want to recruit new employees to fill their vacant positions. Firms can commit to a wage schedule, i.e. a schedule that specifies the wage paid by the firm to its employees as function of their tenure and other observables. However, firms cannot commit to the employment relationship with any of their workers, i.e. firms can dismiss workers at will. We find that, because of the firm's limited commitment, the optimal schedule prescribes not only a rigid wage for senior employees, but also a downward rigid wage for new hires. Moreover, we find that, while the rigidity of the wage of senior workers does not affect the allocation of labor, the rigidity of the wage of new hires magnifies the response of unemployment and vacancies to negative shocks to the aggregate productivity of labor.