Who Gives, Who Gains? Progressivity and Preferences
Who Gives, Who Gains? Progressivity and Preferences
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谁给予，谁收获？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Philipp Rehm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Beramendi;Philipp Rehm
民众对福利国家的支持在多大程度上取决于收入，在不同的国家和政策领域差异很大。我们正式论证并表明，这些变化——在很大程度上被忽视，但对理解再分配政治至关重要——在一定程度上反映了累进性方面税收和转移政策的设计。当累进率高时，政治被收入群体视为零和游戏，关于谁得到什么的冲突加剧。当累进率较低，纳税主体和福利接受者重叠时，再分配斗争在政治上变得不那么突出。我们以发达工业民主国家为样本，对这些预测进行了跨国家和跨政策领域的检验。我们的研究结果表明，税收和转移系统的累进性是收入对再分配偏好的预测能力的主要决定因素。
The extent to which popular support for the welfare state depends on income varies greatly across nations and policy domains. We argue and show formally that these variations—largely overlooked yet essential to understanding the politics of redistribution—reflect in part the design of tax and transfer policies in terms of progressivity. When progressivity is high, politics is perceived by income groups as a zero sum game and conflicts over who gets what intensify. When progressivity is low, and tax contributors and benefit recipients overlap, redistributive struggles become politically less salient. We test these predictions both across nations and across policy domains within a sample of advanced industrial democracies. Our findings indicate that the progressivity of the tax and transfer system is a major determinant of the predictive power of income on preferences for redistribution.