Dynamic Auction Markets with Fiat Money.
Dynamic Auction Markets with Fiat Money.
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法定货币的动态拍卖市场。
DOI：
10.1111/jmcb.12005
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Takashi Shimizu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kazuya Kamiya;Takashi Shimizu
在本文中，我们考虑了使用法定货币促进交易的各种类型的模型，并研究了使用法定货币的模型是否具有相同的均衡分配。特别是，我们调查是否有这样的模型有一个连续的静态平衡。首先，我们提出了一个动态的集中拍卖市场模型的货币，这还没有在文献中研究。我们将其结果与具有预付现金约束的瓦尔拉斯模型的结果进行了比较，并表明结果是非常不同的：瓦尔拉斯市场模型具有确定的平稳均衡，而拍卖市场模型具有连续的平稳均衡。此外，我们还建立了分散拍卖市场和分散市场与讨价还价的模型，并得到类似的结果的动态集中拍卖市场模型。
In this paper, we consider various types of models where fiat money is used to facilitate trades, and investigate whether models with fiat money have the same equilibrium allocations. In particular, we investigate whether or not such models have a continuum of stationary equilibria. We first present a dynamic centralized auction market model with money, which has not been investigated in the literature. We compare its outcome with that of Walrasian models with cash‐in‐advance constraints, and show that the outcomes are very different: the Walrasian markets model has determinate stationary equilibria and the auction markets model has a continuum of stationary equilibria. Moreover, we also build models on decentralized auction markets and on decentralized markets with bargaining, and obtain results similar to those of the dynamic centralized auction markets model.