Microfinance Games
Microfinance Games
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小额信贷游戏
DOI：
10.1596/1813-9450-3959
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Morduch
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
X. Giné;Pamela Jakiela;Dean S. Karlan;J. Morduch
小额信贷被认为是解决信贷市场缺陷的有效途径。但从理论角度来看，小额信贷合同的成功也有令人费解的因素。特别是，经常使用的基于群体的机制很容易受到搭便车和串通的影响，尽管它们也可以减少道德风险和改善选择。作者在秘鲁利马的一个大型城市市场创建了一个实验经济学实验室，并在七个月的时间里进行了11个不同的游戏，让他们能够以系统的方式拆解小额信贷机制。他们发现，冒险行为大体上符合预测的模式，但这种行为比最优行为更安全。这一结果有助于解释为什么开拓性的小额信贷机构一直在放弃基于集团的合同。
Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts.