Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions †
Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions †
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授予价格、合同履行和投标筛选：来自采购拍卖的证据 †
DOI：
10.1257/app.6.1.108
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
F. Decarolis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Decarolis
本文提供了关于首次价格拍卖在授予阶段的低价与出价不具有约束力的承诺时的不良事后绩效之间产生的不正当权衡的证据。通过利用意大利首次拍卖采购公共工程的不同时机，本研究发现，由于事后重新谈判，至少有一半因较低中标价格而节省的成本被损失掉了。筛选最低出价的响应能力可以防止性能恶化，但也会使初始成本节省减少三分之一，并导致合同授予的延迟。
This paper presents evidence on the perverse trade-off that first price auctions induce between low prices at the awarding stage and poor ex post performance when bids are not binding commitments. By exploiting the different timing with which first price auctions were introduced in Italy to procure public works, this study finds that at least half of the cost savings from lower winning prices are lost because of ex post renegotiation. Screening the lowest price bid for its responsiveness prevents performance worsening but also reduces the initial cost savings by a third and induces delays in awarding the contract.