The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy
The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy
复制标题
国际环境政策的利益解释
DOI：
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Tapani Vaahtoranta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Sprinz;Tapani Vaahtoranta
尽管国际环境的相互依存性日益增强，但国际体系缺乏一个促进环境保护的中央权威机构。因此，各国采取了不同的政策来减少国际环境问题。更具体地说，代价高昂的规章制度没有得到普遍支持。为了解释国际环境管制的成功与失败，有必要系统地关注影响主权国家环境外交政策的因素。由于这种方法是从文献中缺失的，我们开发了一个基于利益的解释支持国际环境监管和假设它应该有什么样的影响，对国家的偏好国际环境监管。具体而言，我们将我们的框架应用于关于大气污染控制的两个突出谈判案例，即保护平流层臭氧层的努力和欧洲跨界酸化（“酸雨”）的监管。
Despite growing international environmental interdependence, the international system lacks a central authority to foster environmental protection. As a consequence, countries have adopted different policies to reduce international environmental problems. More specifically, costly regulations are not universally supported. In order to explain the success and failure of international environmental regulation, it is necessary to systematically focus on the factors that shape the environmental foreign policy of sovereign states. Since such an approach is missing from the literature, we develop an interest-based explanation of support for international environmental regulation and postulate what impact it should have on state preferences for international environmental regulation. Specifically we apply our framework to two prominent cases of negotiations on atmospheric pollution control, namely, efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer and the regulation of transboundary acidification (“acid rain”) in Europe.