The Palestinian-Transjordanian rift: Economic might and political power in Jordan
The Palestinian-Transjordanian rift: Economic might and political power in Jordan
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巴勒斯坦-外约旦裂痕：约旦的经济实力和政治实力
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发表时间：
2004
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通讯作者：
Yitzhak Reiter
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作者：
Yitzhak Reiter
自1970年至1971年事件以来，约旦的政治发展将巴勒斯坦社区和外约旦社会（主要是部落）塑造成两个相互冲突的民族群体。约旦籍巴勒斯坦人在政治上是少数，但同时在人口上占微弱多数，通过在私营经济部门的主导地位产生了经济实力，这是加剧族裔间紧张关系的一个根源。对1995-1996年期间约旦500家最大的经济企业和在约旦证券交易所交易的173家公司的数据进行分析后得出的结论是，以外约旦和巴勒斯坦族裔群体为基础的二元、以部门为基础的经济的普遍形象得到了经验的证实。在讨论了约旦经济精英在整个政治体系中的性质之后，作者得出结论，富裕的巴勒斯坦人的经济影响力并没有延伸到政治领域。因此，即使是约旦最富有的个人（或家族公司），也不构成一个压力集团或一个已知的和特定的游说力量，既不作为商人，也不作为基于榨取的次级集团。巴勒斯坦人在约旦的金融活动及其对银行部门的控制使他们作为一个群体具有特殊地位，具有内在的政治影响。经济和政治自由化的进展将使巴勒斯坦人在未来产生更有意义的政治影响力。1995年秋，约旦新闻界就约旦-巴勒斯坦关系爆发了一场激烈的辩论，政治家、学者和专栏作家都参加了辩论。1辩论是在关于约旦和巴勒斯坦实体之间未来关系的民意调查结果公布之后进行的（正在形成的国家）在约旦和巴勒斯坦领土上同时进行的在约旦河西岸和加沙地带，大多数约旦人和巴勒斯坦人都赞成某种形式的政治统一2讨论这两个政治实体之间的未来关系只是审议一个微妙得多的问题的借口，直到20世纪80年代末，约旦媒体和公共会议都将其视为禁忌：巴勒斯坦血统的约旦公民（以下简称：巴勒斯坦人）在约旦的未来，特别是他们的政治权利和公民地位。这一问题是在侯赛因国王于1988年7月宣布约旦司法和行政部门与西岸脱离接触之后首次公开提出的，由于随后的政治事态发展和和平进程，这一问题变得更加严重。1990年至1991年的海湾危机导致超过20万巴勒斯坦人返回约旦，这引起了最初的“东岸”约旦人（以下简称：外约旦人）的担忧，即有利于巴勒斯坦人的人口变化将导致部落精英失去权力。越来越多的外约旦民族主义者认为，和平进程始于1991年的马德里会议，随后以色列和巴勒斯坦解放组织（巴解组织）签署了《原则宣言》。（1993年9月）以及以色列和约旦之间的和平条约（1994年10月）作为改组约旦内部结构的机会：建立一个明确和独立的约旦领土国家和身份，作为和平协议的结果，（落实1967名流离失所的巴勒斯坦人的返回权），并规定只有放弃巴勒斯坦身份并接受政治同化的巴勒斯坦人才能享有政治权利和约旦公民身份，3即接受哈希姆君主制的现行秩序和军队的作用，即使在约旦和未来的菲拉斯廷（巴勒斯坦国）之间可能发生冲突的情况下，也要忠于政权和国家。…
The political developments in Jordan since the events of 1970-71 shaped the Palestinian community and Transjordanian society (mostly tribal) into two conflicting ethnic groups. The Jordanian Palestinians are a political minority, while simultaneously constituting a slim demographic majority yielding economic strength through dominance in the private economic sector, a matter that is a source of heightened inter-communal tensions. Analyzing data on the 500 largest economic concerns in Jordan and on the 173 companies that were traded on the Jordanian stock exchange in 1995-1996 leads to the conclusion that the prevailing image of a dichotomous, sector-based economy grounded in Transjordanian and Palestinian ethnic groups receives empirical corroboration. Following a discussion on the nature of the Jordanian economic elite in terms of the overall political system, the author concludes that the economic influence of wealthy Palestinians does not extend to the political realm. Thus, even the most prosperous individuals (or family corporations) in Jordan do not constitute a pressure group or a known and particular lobbying force, neither as businessmen nor as sub-groups on the basis of extraction. The Palestinians' financial activity in Jordan and their control of the banking sector give them, as a group, a special status with inherent political implications. Progress toward economic and political liberalization will enable the Palestinians to yield more meaningful political influence in the future. In the fall of 1995, a heated debate over Jordanian-Palestinian relations broke out in the Jordanian press, involving politicians, academics, and columnists.1 The debate followed the publication of the results of a public opinion poll on the future relations between Jordan and the Palestinian entity (the state in the making) carried out simultaneously in Jordan and the Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza), in which most Jordanians and Palestinians alike favored some form of political unification (confederation, federation, or complete unity) between Jordan and the future Filastin.2 The discussion of the future relations between the two political entities was only a pretext for the consideration of a much more delicate topic, which until the late 1980s was regarded as taboo in Jordan's media and public conferences: the future of the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian extraction (hereafter: Palestinians) in Jordan, particularly their political rights and civil status. This issue was first raised publicly after King Husayn's announcement, in July 1988, of Jordan's judicial and administrative disengagement with the West Bank, and it took on a new intensity as a result of the ensuing political developments and the peace process. The 1990-91 Gulf crisis resulted in the return to Jordan of over 200,000 Palestinians, which aroused fears among the original "East Bank" Jordanians (hereafter: Transjordanians) that demographic changes favoring the Palestinians would lead to the loss of power of the tribal elite. A growing group of Transjordanian nationalists viewed the peace process beginning with the Madrid Conference of 1991, followed by the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (September 1993) and by the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan (October 1994) as an opportunity to reorganize the internal Jordanian structure: to construct a clear and separate Jordanian territorial nation and identity, to declare the number of Palestinians in the kingdom as an outcome of the peace agreement (implementation of the right of return of 1967 displaced Palestinians), and to stipulate that political rights and Jordanian citizenship would accrue only to those Palestinians who would renounce their Palestinian identity and accept political assimilation,3 i.e. accept the current order of the Hashemite monarchy and the role of the Army, and remain loyal to the regime and the state even in the cases of a possible clash between Jordan and future Filastin (the Palestinian state). …