Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer
Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer
复制标题
当每个代理人提出重新谈判要约时，多代理人激励合同中的道德风险和重新谈判
DOI：
10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00085-7
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Hiroshi Osano
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hiroshi Osano
本文的目的是探讨一个机制，实现所需的均衡行动的一个主体，多代理模型与重新谈判时，每个代理人都可以提出一个重新谈判报价。在一定的信念限制下，我们证明了存在一种总是实施次优策略的机制。
The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for implementing the desired equilibrium actions in the one-principal, multi-agent model with renegotiation when each agent is allowed to make a renegotiation offer. With some belief restriction, we show that there exists a mechanism in which the second-best strategy is always implemented.