Efficient Dynamic Searchable Encryption with Forward Privacy under the Decent Leakage
Efficient Dynamic Searchable Encryption with Forward Privacy under the Decent Leakage
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DOI：
10.1145/3508398.3511521
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发表时间：
2022-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yohei Watanabe;Kazuma Ohara;Mitsugu Iwamoto;K. Ohta
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文献类型：
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作者：
Yohei Watanabe;Kazuma Ohara;Mitsugu Iwamoto;K. Ohta
动态可搜索对称加密（SSE）使客户端能够更新和搜索存储在服务器上的加密数据，并提供高效的搜索操作，而不是泄漏无关紧要的信息。允许的泄漏量是动态SSE的一个关键因素;更多的泄漏允许我们设计一个有效的方案，而泄漏攻击告诉我们，泄漏具有现实世界的影响。泄漏滥用攻击（NDSS 2012）和随后的工作表明，动态SSE方案不应该在搜索过程中不必要地透露额外的信息，特别是文件注入攻击（USENIX Security 2016）表明，在添加过程中限制泄漏的前向隐私是动态SSE的重要安全概念。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的动态SSE方案，该方案具有效率和安全级别的良好平衡;我们的方案既实现了高效率又实现了前向隐私，并且只需要体面的泄漏，即，仅允许在搜索操作期间泄漏搜索和访问模式。具体来说，我们首先发现仍然没有这样的计划，通过发现一个缺陷的安全证明Etemad等人。的方案（PoPETs 2018），并表明需要额外的泄漏来修复它。然后，我们提出了第一个前向私有动态SSE方案，该方案只需要密钥原语和标准的体面泄漏来证明安全性。虽然客户端的信息是略大于现有的计划，我们的实验结果表明，我们的计划是可比Etemad等人。的方案，这是有史以来最有效的方案与前向隐私，在效率方面。
Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) enables clients to update and search encrypted data stored on a server and provides efficient search operations instead of leakages of inconsequential information. The amount of permitted leakage is a crucial factor of dynamic SSE; more leakage allows us to design an efficient scheme, while leakage attacks tell us that the leakage has a real-world impact. Leakage-abuse attacks (NDSS 2012) and subsequent works suggest that dynamic SSE schemes should not unnecessarily reveal extra information during the search procedure, and in particular, file-injection attacks (USENIX Security 2016) showed that forward privacy, which restricts the leakage during the addition procedure, is a vital security notion for dynamic SSE. In this paper, we propose a new dynamic SSE scheme with a good balance of efficiency and security levels; our scheme achieves both high efficiency and forward-privacy and only requires the decent leakage, i.e., only allows the leakage of search and access patterns during search operations. Specifically, we first show there is still no such scheme by uncovering a flaw in the security proof of Etemad et al.'s scheme (PoPETs 2018) and showing that extra leakage is required to fix it. We then propose the first forward-private dynamic SSE scheme that only requires symmetric-key primitives and the standard, decent leakage to prove the security. Although the client's information is slightly larger than existing schemes, our experimental results show that our scheme is comparable to Etemad et al.'s scheme, which is the most-efficient-ever scheme with forward privacy, in terms of efficiency.