Updating Preferences with Multiple Priors
Updating Preferences with Multiple Priors
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使用多个先验更新首选项
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.899006
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发表时间:
2006
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Peter Klibanoff
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Eran Hanany;Peter Klibanoff
We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making under ambiguity. These rules apply to the preferences with multiple priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and are the first, for any model of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg’s paradox) with dynamic consistency for all non-null events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes’ rule to subsets of the set of priors, where the specific subset depends on the preferences, the conditioning event, and the choice problem (i.e., a feasible set of acts together with an act chosen from that set).