Limited Insurance within the Household: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya
Limited Insurance within the Household: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya
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家庭内的有限保险：来自肯尼亚实地实验的证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1282231
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jonathan Robinson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jonathan Robinson
本文介绍了一个随机实地实验的结果，以测试有限的承诺（由于不完整的合同可执行性）在解释肯尼亚家庭内部风险分担安排的重要性。该实验对142名每日收入者及其配偶进行了为期8周的跟踪调查。每周，每个人都有50%的机会受到150肯尼亚先令（2美元）的收入冲击（相当于男性约1.5天的收入和女性1周的收入）。本文有两个主要结果。首先，由于实验性的支付是随机的，因此可以直接测试分配的帕累托效率。我拒绝效率，因为男性的私人物品支出对付款的收取很敏感。第二，实验改变了夫妇之间的实验支付的家庭内部相关性的水平。我发现，当冲击是独立的或负相关时，女性会向丈夫转移更多的资金，这与有限承诺的存在是一致的。我发现男性的转移没有差异，可能是因为冲击太小，不足以导致有限的承诺约束对他们产生约束。
This paper presents results from a randomized field experiment to test for the importance of limited commitment (due to incomplete contract enforceability) in explaining intra-household risk sharing arrangements in Kenya. The experiment followed 142 daily income earners and their spouses for 8 weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50% chance of receiving a 150 Kenyan shilling (US $2) income shock (equivalent to about 1.5 days' income for men and 1 week's income for women). This paper has 2 main results. First, since the experimental payments are random, they allow for a direct test of allocative Pareto efficiency. I reject efficiency, as male private goods expenditures are sensitive to the receipt of the payment. Second, the experiment varied the level of intra-household correlation in the experimental payments between couples. I find that women send bigger transfers to their husbands when shocks are independent or negatively correlated, a result consistent with the presence of limited commitment. I find no difference in transfers for men, likely because the shocks were too small to cause the limited commitment constraint to bind for them.