Combinatorial Auction-Based Pricing for Multi-Tenant Autonomous Vehicle Public Transportation System
Combinatorial Auction-Based Pricing for Multi-Tenant Autonomous Vehicle Public Transportation System
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DOI：
10.1109/tits.2015.2490800
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发表时间：
2015-03
影响因子：
8.5
通讯作者：
Albert Y. S. Lam
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Albert Y. S. Lam
智慧城市通过先进的技术为人民提供高水平的生活，而交通是其中一个主要关注点。随着自动驾驶汽车的出现，近年来提出了一种基于自动驾驶汽车的公共交通系统，它能够提供高效率、高灵活性和低成本的新型交通服务。为了乘客的利益，多租户可以增加市场竞争，从而降低服务费用和提高服务质量。本文研究了多租户公交系统的定价问题，定义了三种类型的服务。每种服务类型的定价过程被建模为一个组合拍卖，在这个过程中，服务提供者作为投标者竞争提供交通服务。拍卖的获胜者是通过整数线性规划来确定的。为了防止投标者提高报价以获得更高的回报，我们提出了一种基于Vickrey-Clarke-Groves的无策略收费机制，以最大化社会福利，为客户结算最终费用。为了验证分析结果并评估充电机制的性能，我们进行了大量的仿真。
A smart city provides its people with high standard of living through advanced technologies, and transport is one of the major foci. With the advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs), an AV-based public transportation system has been proposed recently, which is capable of providing new forms of transportation services with high efficiency, high flexibility, and low cost. For the benefit of passengers, multi-tenancy can increase market competition leading to lower service charge and higher quality of service. In this paper, we study the pricing issue of the multi-tenant AV public transportation system and three types of services are defined. The pricing process for each service type is modeled as a combinatorial auction, in which the service providers, as bidders, compete for offering transportation services. The winners of the auction are determined through an integer linear program. To prevent the bidders from raising their bids for higher returns, we propose a strategy-proof Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-based charging mechanism, which can maximize the social welfare, to settle the final charges for the customers. We perform extensive simulations to verify the analytical results and evaluate the performance of the charging mechanism.