Information Leakage Analysis Using a Co-Design-Based Fault Injection Technique on a RISC-V Microprocessor
Information Leakage Analysis Using a Co-Design-Based Fault Injection Technique on a RISC-V Microprocessor
复制标题
在 RISC-V 微处理器上使用基于协同设计的故障注入技术进行信息泄漏分析
DOI:
10.1109/tcad.2021.3065915
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
2.9
通讯作者:
Brian Dziki
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Plusquellic;Donald E. Owen;T. Mannos;Brian Dziki
The RISC-V instruction set architecture open licensing policy has spawned a hive of development activity, making a range of implementations publicly available. The environments in which RISC-V operates have expanded correspondingly, driving the need for a generalized approach to evaluating the reliability of RISC-V implementations under adverse operating conditions or after normal wear-out periods. Fault injection (FI) refers to the process of changing the state of registers or wires, either permanently or momentarily, and then observing execution behavior. The analysis provides insight into the development of countermeasures that protect against the leakage or corruption of sensitive information, which might occur because of unexpected execution behavior. In this article, we develop a hardware–software co-design architecture that enables fast, configurable fault emulation and utilize it for information leakage and data corruption analysis. Modern system-on-chip FPGAs enable building an evaluation platform, where control elements run on a processor(s) (PS) simultaneously with the target design running in the programmable logic (PL). Software components of the FI system introduce faults and report execution behavior. A pair of RISC-V FI-instrumented implementations are created and configured to execute the Advanced Encryption Standard and Twister algorithms. Key and plaintext information leakage and degraded pseudorandom sequences are both observed in the output for a subset of the emulated faults.