Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially
Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially
复制标题
立法者依次投票时的真诚投票与复杂投票
作者：
T. Groseclose;J. Milyo
在其他地方（Groseclose和Milyo 2010），我们研究了一个游戏，每个立法者都有偏好（i）由此产生的政策和（ii）他或她如何投票。当立法者不是关键时，后一种偏好尤其重要。我们表明，当游戏遵循立法者的正常规则，最重要的是，立法者可以改变他们的投票后，看到他们的同胞立法者投票，那么唯一可能的均衡是一个所有的立法者忽略他们的政策偏好。也就是说，每个立法者投票时，好像他或她不是关键人物。结果与国会的实证研究一致，表明立法者应该倾向于真诚地投票，而不是盲目地投票。在本文中，我们将研究如果我们改变投票规则，结果会如何变化。也就是说，而不是一个同时进行的游戏，我们考虑一个游戏，立法者在一个预先确定的顺序依次投票。我们表明，相反的同时游戏，一个替代品获胜，当且仅当大多数立法者的政策偏好有利于该替代品。我们的研究结果表明，如果国会采纳了这一规则变化，那么复杂的投票将变得频繁而不是罕见。
Elsewhere (Groseclose and Milyo 2010), we examine a game where each legislator has preferences over (i) the resulting policy and (ii) how he or she votes. The latter preferences are especially important when the legislator is not pivotal. We show that when the game follows the normal rules of legislatures—most important, that legislators can change their vote after seeing how their fellow legislators have voted—then the only possible equilibrium is one where all legislators ignore their policy preferences. That is, each legislator votes as if he or she is not pivotal. The result, consistent with empirical studies of Congress, suggests that legislators should tend to vote sincerely, rather than sophisticatedly. In this paper we examine how outcomes change if we change the rules for voting. Namely, instead of a simultaneous game, we consider a game where legislators vote sequentially in a pre-determined order. We show that, opposite to the simultaneous game, an alternative wins if and only if a majority of legislators’ policy preferences favor that alternative. Our results suggest that if Congress adopted this change in rules, then sophisticated voting would become frequent instead of rare.