Democracy and markets: The case of exchange rates
Democracy and markets: The case of exchange rates
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民主与市场：汇率案例
DOI：
10.2307/2669258
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Stix
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
John R. Freeman;Jude C. Hays;H. Stix
民主制度和货币市场的运作之间的关系进行了研究。关于政治（再）平衡如何影响货币市场的几个相互竞争的命题推导和测试。结果支持民主政治影响货币市场的观点。对选举结果和政府生存的预期和不确定性影响货币市场均衡之间转换的概率。此外，关于首席执行官表现的民意调查对货币制度之间切换的概率有直接影响，这表明这些民意调查导致货币交易员修改他们对政府稳定性和（或）公共政策内容的预期。选举制度减轻了政治对货币市场均衡的影响。比例代表制国家的政治影响比多数-多数制国家的政治影响要弱。很少有证据表明央行独立性、共识社团主义体系或“政治一致性”会降低政治对货币市场的影响。对民主和市场的研究是政治经济学的核心。了解政治均衡和经济均衡之间的关系是这一领域面临的主要挑战之一。货币市场的规模和性质使它们成为特别重要的案例。实质上，随着全球化，货币市场已经成为民选政府的重要制约因素，减少了他们的"回旋余地"。从分析上讲，与大多数商品市场相比，货币市场是具有独特均衡的信息有效资产市场：今天的汇率取决于货币交易者对明天汇率的充分知情预期。因此，这些市场对新信息的敏感性使得它们特别适合研究政治新闻和不确定性对经济均衡的影响。本文证明，就汇率决定而言，存在“信息相关”的政治因素，这些因素直接影响货币市场均衡之间的转移概率。此外，这些因素在各民主国家之间存在重要差异。一些选举机构减轻了政治对货币的影响
The relationships between the workings of democratic institutions and currency markets are studied. Severa competing propositions about how political (re)equilibration affects currency markets are derived and tested. The results support the view that democratic politics affects currency markets. Expectations and uncertainty about electoral outcomes and government survival affect the probability of switching between currency-market equilibria. Additionally, opinion polls about chief executive performance have a direct effect on the probabilities of switches between currency regimes suggesting that these polls cause currency traders to revise their expectations about the stability of governments and (or) the contents of public policies. Electoral institutions mitigate the impact of politics on currency-market equilibria. Political effects are weaker in countries with proportional representation electoral systems than in countries with majority-plurality systems. There is less evidence that central-bank independence, consensual-corporatist systems, or "political coherency" reduces the effect of politics on currency markets. he study of democracy and markets is at the heart of political economy. Understanding how political equilibration and economic equilibration are related is one of the main challenges facing this field. The size and nature of currency markets make them especially important cases. Substantively, with globalization, currency markets have become important constraints on elected governments, reducing their "room to maneuver." Analytically, in comparison to most goods markets, currency markets are informationally efficient asset markets with distinctive equilibria: today's exchange rate is determined by currency traders' fully informed expectations about tomorrow's exchange rate. The sensitivity of these markets to the arrival of new information therefore makes them particularly well suited for studying the effects of political news and uncertainty on economic equilibration.1 This article demonstrates there are "informationally relevant" political factors insofar as exchange rate determination is concerned, factors that directly affect the transition probabilities between currency-market equilibria. Moreover, these factors vary in important ways across democracies. Some electoral institutions lessen the effects of politics on currency