Detection of Pilot Spoofing Attack Over Frequency Selective Channels
Detection of Pilot Spoofing Attack Over Frequency Selective Channels
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DOI：
10.1109/ssp.2018.8450703
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发表时间：
2018-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jitendra Tugnait
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jitendra Tugnait
在时分双工（TDD）多天线系统中，可以使用反向训练来估计信道状态信息（CSI）。当在训练阶段期间，对手也发送与合法接收器相同的训练（导频）信号时，发生导频污染（欺骗）攻击。这污染了信道估计并且改变了合法的预编码器/波束成形设计，从而促进了窃听。过去的导频欺骗检测方法仅限于平坦衰落信道。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的方法来检测导频欺骗攻击的频率选择性信道，未知的信道和信道长度，除了信道抽头的数量上界假设是已知的。所提出的方法说明了数值例子，他们显示所提出的方法的有效性。一种方法来估计鲍勃的信道，而不管欺骗攻击，也提出并通过仿真说明。
In a time-division duplex (TDD) multiple antenna system, the channel state information (CSI) can be estimated using reverse training. A pilot contamination (spoofing) attack occurs when during the training phase, an adversary also sends identical training (pilot) signal as that of the legitimate receiver. This contaminates channel estimation and alters the legitimate precoder/beamformimg design, facilitating eavesdropping. Past approaches to pilot spoofing detection are limited to flat fading channels. In this paper we propose a novel approach for detection of pilot spoofing attack over frequency selective channels, with unknown channels and channel lengths, except that an upperbound on the number of channel taps is assumed to be known. The proposed approach is illustrated by numerical examples and they show the efficacy of the proposed approach. A method to estimate Bob’s channel regardless of the spoofing attack, is also presented and illustrated via simulations.