Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation
Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation
复制标题
族裔群体游说和援助分配
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Paschalis Raimondos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Lahiri;Paschalis Raimondos
我们建立了一个对外援助分配的政治经济模型。捐助国的每个民族都游说政府向其原籍国分配更多援助，政府接受游说团体的政治捐款。初始人均收入的受援国和那些民族群体的政治均衡的解决方案的重要决定因素。我们还研究了援助国腐败程度、援助疲劳和种族构成的变化对援助分配的影响。
We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption, aid fatigue, and ethnic composition, in the donor country on the allocation of aid.