The evolution of cooperation in spatially heterogeneous populations
The evolution of cooperation in spatially heterogeneous populations
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DOI：
10.1086/285875
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发表时间：
1996-05-01
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Michod, RE
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ferriere, R;Michod, RE
社会生物学中一个具有挑战性的问题是理解合作在非社会世界中的出现。最近的模型迭代囚徒困境（IPD）游戏的结论是，人口混合由于个人的流动性限制合作，但是，这些模型只代表空间隐式。在这里，我们开发了一个动态的IPD模型，明确考虑人口的时间和空间变化。我们的模型考虑了个体的随机运动和局部相互作用的固有非随机性。通过推导空间版本的汉密尔顿的规则，我们发现，一个阈值水平的移动性在自私的总是缺陷（AD）的球员是需要引起入侵的社会“针锋相对”（TFT）的球员。此外，成功的TFT新来者的流动性水平必须近似等于或略高于居民叛逃者。显著的流动性促进了TFT先驱者在入侵前线和AD入侵者在合作集群核心的分类。这也最大限度地提高了TFT报复的可能性。一旦TFT接管AD的第一步完成，更慷慨，也许更可疑的策略可能会超过TFT并取代TFT。我们得出的条件下，这种更强大的合作策略的持续演变发生。
A challenging problem in sociobiology is to understand the emergence of cooperation in a nonsocial world. Recent models of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game conclude that population mixing due to individual mobility limits cooperation; however, these models represent space only implicitly. Here we develop a dynamical IPD model where temporal and spatial variations in the population are explicitly considered. Our model accounts for the stochastic motion of individuals and the inherent nonrandomness of local interactions. By deriving a spatial version of Hamilton's rule, we find that a threshold level of mobility in selfish always-defect (AD) players is required to beget invasion by social ''tit for tat'' (TFT) players. Furthermore, the level of mobility of successful TFT newcomers must be approximately equal to or somewhat higher than that of resident defectors. Significant mobility promotes the assortment of TFT pioneers on the front of invasion and of AD intruders in the core of a cooperative cluster. It also maximizes the likelihood of TFT retaliation. Once this first step whereby TFT takes over AD is completed, more generous and perhaps more suspicious strategies may outperform and displace TFT. We derive the conditions under which this continued evolution of more robust cooperative strategies occurs.