Golden Shares - State Control in Privatised Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects
Golden Shares - State Control in Privatised Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects
复制标题
Golden Shares - 私有化公司的国家控制：比较法、欧洲法律和政策方面
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Florian Möslein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stefan Grundmann;Florian Möslein
自2002年6月4日欧洲法院做出三个相关判决以来，黄金股票一直是一个备受争议的问题。辩论涉及国家在前国有企业私有化后继续持有的权利，即使其持股减少到最低限度或不再存在。国有企业及其可能的不同形式是出发点，但对我们的讨论没有多大意义。相反，我们关注的是在这一过程中产生的特殊权利，以及一般公司法的可比文书。事实上，这是公司法的一个问题：到目前为止，大多数特殊权利取决于对一股（黄金）股票的所有权，因此提出了股票赋予的平等权利（“一股一票”）的问题。无论如何，特殊权利改变了公司的决策权，也改变了公司所有权结构的发展。为了组织材料，一方面，我们区分了授予国家机构的不同类型的权利（以及可能的反诉和授予投资者的审查权利）。这不是一个纯粹的技术问题：这个问题是属于公司法和资本市场法，还是基本上属于公法，取决于这一点。第二个区别是包含这些权利的文书的区别。实质上，授予两种不同类型的权利。一方面，有一些特殊的权利与公司的一个机构，主要是股东大会的决策过程有关。公司治理发生了变化。主题事项可能涉及基本决策，也可能涉及具有战略重要性的管理决策。任命董事会成员的权利也会产生类似的结果。另一方面，还可以授予第二种权利：影响公司股东结构的权利，这种权利本身不属于公司的业务。在这种情况下，如果一个人的持股超过一定的门槛，就会给予否决权。这两种权利可以采取各种形式，但在功能上具有可比性。作为欧洲法院判决的结果，重要的是，是否可以以该权利应给予保护的公司或一般公众所面临的风险在这一特定案件中不存在为理由对授予的权利的行使提出质疑。同样重要的是程序安排。在欧洲法院的判决公布后，利益相关方迅速否定了与德国最重要的私有化法律——“大众”法案的任何关联。我们认为，这些决定甚至可能对一般公司法产生更广泛的影响。欧洲法院关注的是，获得任何资本投资是否在法律上或事实上被阻止，或者仅仅是降低了吸引力。因此，任何减少股东决策权的安排都可能是相关的。人们必须通过考虑与黄金份额的典型特征相关的可比现象，并通过询问欧洲法院适用的标准是否与这些现象有关，来了解土地是如何存在的。从系统的欧洲法律角度以及价值判断的问题来看，至关重要的是，这些考虑同样适用于授予私法主体额外权利的结构，因为它们也侵犯了其他股东在投票权或决策自由方面的权利。在对影响股东结构的交易授予否决权的情况下，法院适用的审查标准特别严格。最重要的例子是实际上防止收购的规则：投票上限或多重投票权，以及一些立法者授予管理层的一系列防御措施。
Golden Shares are a much debated issue since the European Court of Justice delivered three relevant judgments on June 4, 2002. The debate concerns rights that the State continues to hold after privatising formerly state owned enterprises, even if its shareholding is reduced to a minimum or no longer exists. State owned enterprises and their different possible forms are the starting point, but only of minor interest for our discussion. Instead, we focus on special rights arising during this process, as well as comparable instruments of general company law. And indeed the issue is rather one of company law: By far the majority of special rights depend on the ownership of one (Golden) share, and accordingly raise the question of equal rights conferred by shares ("one share, one vote"). In any event, special rights alter decision powers in a company as well as the development of its ownership structure. In order to structure the material we distinguish, on the one hand, different types of rights conferred on the state body (as well as possible counterclaims and rights of review granted to investors). This is not a purely technical question: Whether the issue falls under company and capital market law, or substantially under public law, is dependent upon this point. The second distinction is that of the instrument in which these rights are embedded. In essence, two different types of rights are granted. On the one hand, there are special rights which relate to the decision process of one body of the company, principally the general meeting. Corporate Governance is changed. Subject matters might concern fundamental decisions but also management decisions of strategic importance. A right to appoint board members can produce similar results. On the other hand, there is a second type of rights which can be granted: rights to influence the shareholder structure of the company which is not part of the company's business as such. In these cases, veto rights are given in the event that the shareholding of one person exceeds certain thresholds. Both types of rights may take various forms that are functionally comparable. As a consequence of the ECJ judgements, it will be important whether the exercise of the right conferred can be challenged on the grounds that the risk for the company or the general public against which the right should give protection did not exist in this particular case. Of equal importance is the procedural arrangement. Immediately after publication of the ECJ judgements, interested parties quickly discounted any relevance for the "Volkswagen" legislation, the most important German privatisation law. We argue that the decisions might even have much broader effects on general company law. The ECJ focused on whether access to any capital investment is legally or factually prevented or merely made less attractive. Therefore, any arrangement that reduces decision making power of shareholders might be relevant. One has to see how the land lies by taking into account comparable phenomena with respect to the typical features of the Golden Share, and by asking whether the criteria applied by the ECJ are of any relevance as to these phenomena. From a systematic European law perspective as well as a matter of value judgement, it is of utmost importance that these considerations apply equally to constructions granting additional rights to private law subjects, for they too impinge upon other shareholders' rights with regard to their voting power or their freedom of decision-making. The standard of review applied by the Court of Justice has been particularly strict where veto rights had been granted with respect to transactions influencing the shareholder structure. The most important example are rules that in fact prevent take-overs: voting caps or multiple voting rights, but also the arsenal of defensive measures that some legislators grant to the management.