A SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH MODEL WITH FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
A SCHUMPETERIAN GROWTH MODEL WITH FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
复制标题
具有金融中介机构的熊彼特增长模型
DOI：
10.1017/s1365100517000426
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Sunaga Miho
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Edzuka Tomoya;Goshima Goshima;江塚智哉;Tomoya Edzuka;江塚智哉;Sunaga Miho
本研究将金融中介引入到Aghion等人（2005，Quarterly Journal of Economics，Vol. 120，pp. 173-222）。他们收取家庭存款，为创业项目提供资金，并监督创业者。我考虑的是一个存在道德风险问题的经济体：企业家可以隐藏成功创新的结果，从而避免偿还金融中介机构，如果后者不监督企业家的表现。本文分析了金融中介活动对技术进步和经济增长的影响。我表明，金融中介机构需要监测企业家在经济的法律的保护债权人是不够强大。这种监督可以解决道德风险问题;但是，它并不总是促进技术创新，因为它可能增加企业创新的成本，从而减少创新投资额。我还研究了金融中介机构的监管如何通过金融市场的严格性影响个人的福利。
This study introduces financial intermediaries into the Schumpeterian growth model developed by Aghion et al. (2005, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120, pp. 173–222). They collect deposits from households, provide funds for entrepreneurial projects, and monitor the entrepreneurs. I consider an economy with moral hazard problems: entrepreneurs can hide the result of a successful innovation and thereby avoid repaying financial intermediaries if the latter do not monitor entrepreneurial performance. I analyze the effects of financial intermediaries' activities on technological progress and economic growth in such an economy. I show that financial intermediaries need to monitor entrepreneurs in an economy where the legal protection of creditors is not strong enough. Such monitoring can resolve the moral hazard problem; however, it does not always promote technological innovation, because it could increase the cost of entrepreneurial innovation and thus reduce the amount invested for innovation. I also examine how monitoring by financial intermediaries affects the welfare of individuals through the stringency of financial markets.