Crossing networks and dealer markets: Competition and performance
Crossing networks and dealer markets: Competition and performance
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DOI：
10.1111/0022-1082.00281
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发表时间：
2000-10-01
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
Mendelson, H
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hendershott, T;Mendelson, H
本文研究了交易商市场与一种相对较新的交易形式——被动交叉网络之间的相互作用，其中买卖双方直接进行交易。我们发现交叉网络具有正外部性（“流动性”）和负外部性（“拥挤”）的特征，并分析了其引入对交易商市场的影响。将庄家市场作为“最后手段的市场”的交易者可以诱导庄家扩大点差，并可以带来更有效的后续价格，但仅使用交叉网络的交易者可以通过减少逆向选择和库存持有成本来提供平衡效果。
This paper studies the interaction between dealer markets and a relatively new form of exchange, passive crossing networks, where buyers and sellers trade directly with one another We find that the crossing network is characterized by both positive ("liquidity") and negative ("crowding") externalities, and we analyze the effects of its introduction on the dealer market. Traders who use the dealer market as a "market of last resort" can induce dealers to widen their spread and can lead to more efficient subsequent prices, but traders who only use the crossing network can provide a counterbalancing effect by reducing adverse selection and inventory holding costs.