Tenancy Contract Choice and Land Improvement Investment for Upland Farming
Tenancy Contract Choice and Land Improvement Investment for Upland Farming
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旱地农业租赁合同的选择和土地改良投资
DOI：
10.18480/jjre.12.33
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Nakajima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Nakajima
针对具体关系的土地改良投资(例如深耕和土壤覆盖)对于旱地耕作是必要的。如果租赁农田的农民处于能够自由决定是否投资于土地改良的环境中，就不会出现问题。然而，如果他们在土地改良方面的投资意向受到某些因素的抑制，就可能出现因投资不足而导致低效耕作的问题。投资不足的问题最有可能发生在非记录农业合同(Yami Kosaku)下，这是一种“不完全合同”，因为合同期不是预先确定的。由于合同不完备，农民不愿意投资，因为他们无法预测在面临驱逐威胁的同时是否会收回投资价值(即滞留问题)。在此基础上，本文利用爱知县松尾町的原始数据，对农户土地改良投资选择的契约类型(即建立使用权基础或非备案契约基础)的实证决定因素进行了实证分析。主要研究结果如下。首先，使用权合同鼓励农民投资租赁土地。研究表明，契约类型对土地投资动机有影响。其次，研究还发现，土地所有者和农民之间的信任程度(如亲缘关系和亲近程度)对土地投资有正向影响。第三个发现是，关于土地所有者从事农业的灵活性的机会成本程度也影响合同选择。不太可能从事农业的土地所有者非常倾向于选择使用权合同。这些发现呼吁地方政府鼓励签订使用权合同，并制定“受益费用”补偿计划，为农民提供土地改良的激励。
Relationship-specific investment in land improvement (e.g. deep plowing and soil dressing) is necessary for upland farming. If farmers leasing farmland are in an environment where they are able to freely decide whether or not to invest in land improvement, no problem arises. However, if their intention to invest in land improvement is inhibited by some factors, the problem of inefficient farming due to underinvestment may arise. The problem of underinvestment is most likely to occur under off-the-record farming contracts (yami kosaku), which are a type of “incomplete contract” in the sense that the contract period is not predetermined. Because of incomplete contracts, farmers are unwilling to invest since they cannot predict if they will recoup their investment value while being open to eviction threats (i.e. holdup problem). Based on these points, this paper aims to analyze the empirical determinants on contract type (i.e. establishing right of use basis, or off-the-record contract basis) and the farmers'investment choice in land improvement, using original data from Atsumi-cho, Aichi Prefecture. The main findings are as follows. First, use-right contracts encourage farmers to invest in the leased land. It was indicated that the type of contract influences the incentive for land investment. Second, it was also found that the degree of trust (e.g. kinship and proximity) between the landowner and the farmer positively influences land investment. The third finding was that the degree of opportunity cost regarding the landowner's flexibility to engage in farming also influences contract choice. Landowners not likely to engage in agriculture were highly inclined to opt for use-right contracts. These findings call for the encouragement of use-right contracts by local governments, and a compensation scheme for “beneficial expenses” in order to provide farmers with incentives for land improvement.