Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science
复制标题
波士顿科学哲学研究
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-010-3381-7
复制
发表时间：
1968
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
M. Wartofsky
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Frank;R. Cohen;M. Wartofsky
“语义不可通约性”，即来自不同理论的概念的不可可译性，是争论的焦点。我试图对费耶阿本德和后来的库恩的著作背后的概念进行理性的重建。我声称，这样一个连贯的概念可以被识别出来，并且存在相关的实例。不可通约性是由理论上的不相容引起的。不可通约概念之间的翻译失败，主要是由于语境意义理论赋予翻译的两个充分性条件无法同时满足。潜在的概念类比要么不能保留应用条件，要么不能再现相关的推理关系。事实证明，这一特征与相关科学类型的交叉分类有关。这些不可通约的概念之间的关系足以对其中所提出的主张进行经验比较
"Semantic incommensurability", i.e., non-translatabilityofconcepts taken from different theories, is at the focus of the argument. 1 attempt to give a rational reconstruction of the notion underlying the writings of Feyerabend and the later Kuhn. 1 claim that such a coherent notion can be identified and that relevant instances exist. Incommensurability is brought about by theoretical incompatibility. The translation failure between incommensurable concepts arises from the impossibility ofjointly fulfilling two conditions of adequacy that the context theory of meaning places an translations. Potential conceptual analogs either fail to preserve the conditions ofapplication or to reproduce the relevant inferential relations. This feature turns out tobe correlated with a cross-classification ofthe pertinent scientific kinds. These relations between incommensurable concepts are sufficient tot making an empirical comparison ofthe claims couched in these